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NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR OLD
NEIGHBORHOODS
Robert C. Ellickson†
Residential Community Associations are now the norm in new
suburban developments, and in this Article, Professor Robert Ellick-
son suggests that existing neighborhoods, in inner cities and elsewhere,
would benefit from similar institutions. Specifically, he proposes the
creation of Block Improvement Districts. These Districts would typi-
cally be formed by supermajorities of property owners, who would
need to have the power to override objectors to avoid the free rider
problem inherent in many kinds of group action. Once formed, these
Districts would collect fees from member property owners and, in re-
turn, would provide block-level public goods. After exploring both the
theoretical and practical aspects of Block Improvement Districts, Pro-
fessor Ellickson concludes by advocating experimentation with these
institutions as a way of more conclusively determining their value.
       † Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. This Article
formed the basis of the Brainard Currie Memorial Lecture delivered at the Duke University
School of Law on February 26, 1998. A prior version was presented at the Donner Conference
on Property Rights, convened by the Law and Economics Center of the George Mason Univer-
sity School of Law; portions of that presentation appear in The (Limited) Ability of Urban
Neighbors to Contract for the Provision of Local Public Goods, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming 1998). I thank Richard Briffault,
Clayton Gillette, Roberta Romano, and Stephen F. Williams for suggestions, and Julie Becker
for able research assistance.
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The way to multiply big problems is to neglect small ones. There is
nothing seriously wrong with our institution of property or our insti-
tutional system save our proclivity to waste time in attacking or de-
fending it and to neglect proper tasks of changing it continuously by
wise collective experimentation.1
INTRODUCTION
West 163rd Street crosses Washington Heights, a neighborhood
near the northern tip of Manhattan. The scene there is typical of a
poor section of an inner city. Drug dealers operate openly in the
streets and in abandoned buildings. Graffiti and peeling paint disfig-
ure aging facades. Rubbish accumulates in vacant lots. The sidewalks,
street furniture, and street plantings are in a sorry state. The amelio-
ration of many of these conditions would be cost-justified, but no in-
stitution is providing the collective goods and services necessary to
improve the situation. What is to be done?
According to a September 1997 newspaper account,2 officers of
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) have concluded that
the residents of West 163rd Street primarily need new micro-
institutions to enable them to take collective action at the block level.
Leaders of the Thirty-Third Precinct of the NYPD have been en-
couraging the residents to form a tenant association in each apart-
ment building, and have the eventual goal of organizing all residents
into an overarching block association. Because membership in each
of these associations would be voluntary, however, the NYPD offi-
cers have had to overcome residents’ fears that the drug dealers who
parade on the block would single out neighborhood activists for re-
taliation. The police officers are reported to have achieved some suc-
cess in organizing the block’s residents and in helping them deliver
previously neglected services. But many residents are not confident
that their fragile new institutions will endure when the officers of the
Thirty-Third Precinct shift to other endeavors. The block’s residents
face a classic problem of collective action: when the provision of local
public goods is voluntary, each individual may be tempted to take a
free ride.3
1. HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 33 (1948).
2. See Kit R. Roane, Siege of 163rd Street: Police Take Over Drug-Ridden Block to Save
It, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at 41.
3. See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
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In this Article I propose a legal structure for a block-level insti-
tution that would be resistant to the free riding that threatens to un-
dermine the NYPD’s efforts on 163rd Street. I refer to this micro-
institution as a Block Improvement District (BLID).4 My proposal
builds on—but in important ways departs from—the ideas of George
Liebmann and Robert Nelson, two pioneers who have striven to de-
sign new micro-institutions for old neighborhoods.5 The basic idea is
to enable the retrofitting of the residential community association—
an institution commonly found in new housing developments—to a
previously subdivided block such as the one on 163rd Street in
Washington Heights. Unlike a voluntary-membership tenants asso-
ciation of the sort that the NYPD has been pushing, in the usual in-
stance a BLID would be mandatory-membership association of prop-
erty owners.6 A BLID would levy assessments on its members in
order to finance services supplementary to those ordinarily provided
by local governments. Partly because I propose authorizing the own-
ers of a supermajority of property to compel dissenting property
owners to join a BLID, this innovation would require passage of a
state enabling act to govern the formation, structure, and powers of
these institutions. Legislative drafters could pattern these statutes af-
ter the ones that many states have enacted during the past decade to
authorize the establishment of mandatory-membership Business Im-
provement Districts (BIDs).7 Just as BIDs have successfully revital-
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 111-15 (1992) (discussing the free rider problem
in the context of community governance).
4. The abbreviation “BID” is unavailable because it currently is used to refer to a Busi-
ness Improvement District. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Because the BID prece-
dent helped inspire the BLID proposal, the close affinity between the two acronyms seems fit-
ting.
5. See GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE LITTLE PLATOONS: SUB-LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
MODERN HISTORY (1995); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and
Block Associations, 25 URB. LAW. 335 (1993); ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS (1977); Robert H. Nelson, Privatize Inner-City Neighborhoods, AM. ENTER.,
Nov./Dec. 1996, at 68; Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace
Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods (Aug. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Nelson, Privatizing the Neighbor-
hood].
6. Because I envision property-owner control as the default form of BLID governance, I
have this form in mind when I refer to a BLID in the ensuing analysis. The promoters of a
BLID, however, should be free to propose a variant governance structure, for instance, one
that enfranchises tenants. See infra Part III.A.
7. See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? The Business Im-
provement District and Urban Governance (Dec. 4, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) [hereinafter Briffault, A Government for Our Time] (offering a comprehensive
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ized many central business districts,8 BLIDs may be able to rejuve-
nate inner-city residential areas.
I. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR PROVIDING BLOCK-LEVEL
PUBLIC GOODS
Local public goods are services or physical improvements that
enhance the appeal of a discrete, circumscribed territory. Some local
public goods, such as a mosquito abatement program, a sewage
treatment facility, or a tourism office, can benefit an entire metro-
politan area. This Article focuses, however, on the provision of public
goods that typically benefit only a few blocks—for example, a tot-lot,
a street planter, or a block patrol officer.9
City residents, including residents of low-income and minority
neighborhoods, care greatly about the appearance and orderliness of
their streets.10 The “Broken Windows” theory of crime developed by
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling offers an explanation for
why residents would be so concerned about their block-front envi-
ronments.11 According to Wilson and Kelling, physical disorder sig-
nals social breakdown. An onlooker construes the visible presence of
drunks, prostitutes, litter, graffiti, and other low-level annoyances on
account of the legal and policy issues surrounding BIDs); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublo-
cal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 517-21 (1997); Mark S. Davies,
Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 187 (1997) (providing a
generally favorable assessment of BIDs); David J. Kennedy, Restraining the Power of Business
Improvement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
283, 294-99 (1996) (criticizing the undemocratic nature of BIDs in New York).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Houstoun, Jr., Gotham Gets Civil, URB. LAND, Oct. 1997, at 80
(discussing the contributions of New York City’s forty BIDs); David M. Halbfinger, For Now:
215 Blocks Without Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at 33 (describing the successes of Alli-
ance for Downtown New York, a BID operating in Lower Manhattan).
9.  For discussions of efficiencies of scale and scope in the provision of public goods, see
HOWARD W. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOODS: THEIR PLACE IN URBAN LIFE 68-69 (1984); Vin-
cent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 831 (1961). See also DOUGLAS YATES, NEIGHBORHOOD DEMOCRACY (1973) (reporting
the results of various experiments with decentralization).
10.  See MATTHEW A. CRENSON, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS 118-20 (1983) (reporting
survey results indicating that lower-income people strongly dislike dirt, dilapidation, and
crime); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 56 (1990) (reporting a +.88 correlation in assessments of street
disorder between higher- and lower-income respondents, and a +.87 correlation between blacks
and whites).
11. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neigh-
borhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32.
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a block as a sign of basic inadequacies of public policing and informal
discipline. Wilson and Kelling argue that uncorrected disorders tend
to multiply because a potential miscreant regards the evident absence
of social controls at a location as an additional temptation to misbe-
have there. Conversely, the repair of broken windows (and the like)
is a block-level public good because it proclaims the return of effec-
tive governance. Much evidence supports the validity of the “Broken
Windows” theory.12 For instance, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s efforts to
attack quality-of-life crimes in New York City are widely regarded as
having contributed to falling felony rates.13 Healthy daffodils in a
sidewalk planter, it appears, may help deter armed robbery.
Sometimes property owners can succeed in providing block-level
public goods even in the absence of a formal institution.14 For exam-
ple, informally enforced social norms may induce building owners to
paint facades or trim shrubbery. Property owners also may manage to
coordinate by express contract, perhaps one that divides the costs of
hiring a street patrol service.15 These decentralized systems work best
when a block’s owners and residents belong to a closely knit social
group. Many inner-city blocks, however, lack social cohesion. When
relevant owners and residents are heterogeneous and more numerous
than a dozen or two, their efforts at voluntary coordination are likely
to be beset by significant free rider problems.16
A formal institution with coercive powers therefore may be
needed to provide block-level public goods. At what territorial scale
should such an institution operate? In the continuum of possible sizes
12. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 108-56, 195-206 (1996)
(describing how order-maintenance programs reduced crime rates in New York City and Bal-
timore); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
372-73 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Craig Horowitz, The Suddenly Safer City, N.Y. MAG., Aug. 14, 1995, at 20,
23; Kahan, supra note 12, at 367-69.
14. For a general overview of self-governed common resources, see ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990).
15. One commentator has stated (without citing authority) that the number of voluntary
block associations operating in New York City increased from a few hundred to over one thou-
sand between 1965 and 1980. See Mark Frazier, Privatizing the City, 12 POL’Y REV. 91, 95
(Spring 1980).
16. For a classic synopsis of reasons why an increase in group size leads to a higher inci-
dence of free riding, see MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (1965). But cf. FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS
AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES: THE MARKET PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES 1-16 (1994)
(arguing that most commentators exaggerate the risks of free riding).
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three candidates stand out: the block, the neighborhood, and the city.
A city’s boundaries are obvious, but those of a block or neighbor-
hood are not. A face-block is a territory that consists of the lots that
front both sides of a common street.17 In this Article, “block” denotes
an area including from one to a handful of face-blocks.
“Neighborhood,” by contrast, denotes an area big enough to be
known by a name that is meaningful to outsiders. Washington
Heights is a neighborhood, as are Hancock Park in Los Angeles,
Hyde Park in Chicago, and Trinity Park in Durham. While most
blocks have a resident population that numbers only in the dozens or
hundreds, a neighborhood’s population typically ranges from 2,000 to
50,000.18
What are the comparative advantages of block, neighborhood,
and city institutions in providing block-level public goods? The co-
nundrum of the optimal fixing of boundaries arises in many con-
texts—in the sizing of business firms, land parcels, and other units of
resource management, as well as territorial governments. An adjust-
ment in territorial size simultaneously affects the efficiency of the
scale of production, the transaction costs of internal governance, and
the seriousness of transboundary spillover effects.19 Like other peo-
ple, urban residents recognize that the ideal scale of governance var-
ies with the task at hand. They therefore commonly create a
“federal” system of governance—that is, nested territorial institu-
tions operating at varying scales. A federal system typically honors
the principle of subsidiarity, which calls for the allocation of a gov-
ernmental function to the most decentralized institution competent
to perform it.
A. The Niche for Block-Level Institutions
Before exploring the theoretical advantages of the provision of
services by block-level entities, I adduce evidence that participants in
markets for new residential areas have been busily creating institu-
tions that operate at that scale. What works in a new subdivision can
provide clues about what might work in an old one.
17. I borrow “face-block” from GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
COMMUNITY 55-57 (1972). Suttles asserts that urbanites regard these as the smallest residential
collectivities.
18. For discussions of how to define a neighborhood and its boundaries, see HALLMAN,
supra note 9, at 12-17, 56-58; SUTTLES, supra note 17, at 57-61.
19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-34 (1993).
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1. Lessons from the Residential Community Association.
Residential community associations (RCAs)20 have been greeted with
resounding approval in new real estate developments. The number of
RCAs in the United States increased from fewer than 1,000 in 196021
to an estimated 205,000 in 1998.22 By 1998 more than forty million
Americans were living within the jurisdiction of an RCA.23
Today a developer of a large subdivision routinely organizes a
mandatory-membership RCA before selling the first unit and publi-
cizes the RCA during the marketing period. This business strategy is
sound only if most homebuyers anticipate that the value of an RCA’s
services will exceed the costs of assessments and other burdens it will
engender. The prevalence of RCAs in new developments demon-
strates that most homebuyers sense that these micro-institutions are
effective providers of low-level public goods.24 Because members
rarely vote to terminate an RCA,25 their initial expectations appar-
ently tend to be fulfilled. Indeed, residents of RCAs generally report
a high level of satisfaction with the operation of their associations.26
Surveys have found that an average RCA includes from 40 to
160 dwelling units.27 This is a strong clue that micro-institutions retro-
20. “Residential community association” appears to have won out over competing labels
such as “homeowners association.” For example, both DILGER, supra note 3, and Liebmann,
supra note 5, refer to RCAs. On the history of RCAs in the United States, see DILGER, supra
note 3, at 41-60.
21. See DILGER, supra note 3, at 18.
22. See Felicia Paik, Private Properties, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1998, at W8 (reporting data
collected by the Community Associations Institute in Alexandria, Va.).
23. See id.
24.  There is some evidence that, all else equal, most housing consumers are willing to pay
a significant premium to live in a neighborhood served by an RCA. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Com-
mon Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 334
(1998).
25. A leading practitioner of RCA law reports that it is “extremely rare” for members to
decide to close down an ongoing association. Indeed, when the original declaration has created
an association that is to last for only a limited time span and the sunset date approaches, mem-
bers commonly make great efforts to extend the association’s life. Telephone Interview with
Wayne S. Hyatt, Partner, Hyatt & Stubblefield (Aug. 27, 1998). The attorney who served as
president of the Community Associations Institute during 1995-96 confirms that members sel-
dom seek to terminate an association. The prime candidate for eventual extinction is an asso-
ciation that a developer reluctantly created solely to appease the demands of zoning authorities
or lenders. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Diamond, Partner, Hazel & Thomas, P.C.
(Aug. 27, 1998).
26. See DILGER, supra note 3, at 89-90.
27. See id. at 20. The private street associations in St. Louis County, much-analyzed pre-
cursors of the modern RCAs, generally are similarly sized. In four St. Louis suburbs the aver-
age sizes of these associations ranged from 21 to 102 dwelling units. See Ronald J. Oakerson,
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fitted onto already subdivided urban lands should be scaled to the level
of the block, not of the neighborhood.28
There are significant differences, of course, between an RCA in
a new subdivision and a BLID on an inner-city block. First, because
the declaration creating an RCA is recorded before the first unit is
transferred, a buyer of an RCA dwelling makes a voluntary decision
to accept the association along with the residence. By contrast, if the
owners of a supermajority of the property were to retrofit a BLID,
the members of the outvoted minority would have been coerced into
membership. Second, many RCAs have no municipal lands within
their boundaries. In a typical BLID, by contrast, the key common
area would consist of a public street and its sidewalks, whose man-
agement a BLID usually would have to share with its city. Third, al-
though RCAs appear in many varieties, in most of them members are
relatively homogeneous and also relatively prosperous (or at least
not poor). The effectiveness of block-level government in diverse,
lower-income neighborhoods is unproven. Taken together, these dif-
ferences might thwart the successful transplantation of the RCA
model to the inner-city block. Only experiments with BLIDs will tell.
2. Some Advantages of Block-Level Institutions. Why have
housing markets generated tens of thousands of RCAs that typically
contain only a few dozens or hundreds of dwelling units? Small
institutions may outperform larger ones for a number of reasons.
First, micro-institutions seem to be efficiently scaled to produce the
most localized varieties of public goods. RCAs in suburban
developments commonly engage in removal of refuse, landscaping of
public spaces, management of recreation facilities such as swimming
pools, and administration of regulations such as architectural
Private Street Associations in St. Louis County, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 55, 56 (1989); see also
David T. Beito & Bruce Smith, The Formation of Urban Infrastructure Through Nongovern-
mental Planning: The Private Places of St. Louis, 1869-1920, 16 J. URB. HIST. 263 (1990)
(explaining the formation and characteristics of private street associations).
RCAs tend to be somewhat less populous than the “deme,” the basic unit of local gov-
ernment in ancient Athens, which had an average adult population of about 400. See
Liebmann, supra note 5, at 372-73.
28.  Typically an RCA is created in conjunction with a new development project. In these
instances the efficient scale of construction and marketing activities may influence a devel-
oper’s decision on RCA size. Because a BLID would be retrofitted onto an existing
streetscape, data on the sizing of condominium conversions and similar retrofitting efforts
might be more pertinent to the issue of the optimal sizing of a BLID. Unfortunately, there have
been few studies of the sizing of retrofitted associations as such.
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controls. Similarly, in an inner city, a BLID might involve itself in
maintaining sidewalk planters and tot-lots, removing litter and
abandoned vehicles, conducting block-watch programs,29 and
providing other highly localized benefits.
Second, block-level institutions are better able than neighbor-
hood institutions to cater to individuals’ tastes for uncommonly pro-
vided public goods. For instance, if artists were to concentrate their
studios on a particular city block, their BLID could make unusually
heavy expenditures on street sculptures. Indeed, the prospect of
forming a Block Improvement District might encourage artists to
cluster together in the first place.30
Third, support from a coterminous informal social network helps
an institution flourish. A high level of solidarity generally is easier to
maintain within a small group than within a large one. Heterogeneity
of interests is less likely when numbers are few. Smallness also en-
hances the quality of internal gossip and the frequency of chance en-
counters. These features of a small group help its members adminis-
ter informal rewards and punishments on one another.31 As a result,
at the block level, social pressures to pull one’s oar tend to be
stronger than they are at the neighborhood level.32 Indeed, the act of
creating a formal block-level organization such as a BLID might fos-
ter acquaintanceships that would then strengthen the informal social
capital of the block’s residents and property owners.33 A person who
29.  Experiments with voluntary block-watch programs in Chicago and Minneapolis failed
to produce higher levels of neighborhood satisfaction. See SKOGAN, supra note 10, at 137-49. It
is unclear whether these disappointing results were largely attributable to a dishearteningly
high incidence of free riding or to other program defects.
30.  Cf. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (envisaging households “voting with their feet” among municipalities offering varying
packages of public goods). On the optimal size of territorial clubs engaging in Tiebout-style
competition, see FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 62-78.
31.  For a list of sources supporting this proposition, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW 182 nn.48-49 (1991). Note also that experiments indicate that the ability to
communicate significantly reduces free riding in the supply of public goods. See Gary J. Miller,
The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1173, 1179-81
(1997).
32.  See Oakerson, supra note 27, at 59-60 (concluding that the smallness of private street
associations in St. Louis was essential to their success in smoothly solving collective action
problems). By analogy, most faculty members seem to be more dutiful citizens of their depart-
ments than they are of their universities.
33.  A 1987 survey found that 74% of RCAs were distributing a newsletter at least four
times a year. See DILGER, supra note 3, at 139. On the concept of social capital, see JAMES S.
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK 163-85 (1993). On the benefits of social capital at the block level, see
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knows his neighbors is more likely, say, to keep his facade painted, to
refrain from littering, and to reprimand delinquent children on the
block. As Jane Jacobs has perceptively observed, the presence of in-
formal “eyes upon the street” enhances a pedestrian’s sense of secu-
rity.34 Establishment of a BLID on a block might add to the number
not only of formal block patrols, but also of informal lookouts.
Fourth and finally, block-level institutions are well scaled to
strengthen members’ involvement and skills in collective governance.
Many commentators seek to revitalize civic life in the United States.35
They should welcome block organizations that might serve as incuba-
tors of local social capital.36 The proceedings of a block organization
would provide easy opportunities for people to engage in meaningful
debate, voting, office-seeking, and other forms of community partici-
pation.37 Candidates for office would be few.38 There would be little or
no wait to speak at a meeting.39 Participants would be unlikely to be
Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective
Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
34.  See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35-37 (1961).
35.  See, e.g., ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (1985); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT (1996); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s
Declining Social Capital, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1995, at 65.
36.  There is a lively debate over whether an institution governed by property owners can
provide true opportunities for meaningful participation in community life. See DILGER, supra
note 3, at 36-40, 131-44, 153-54. For a skeptical view, see Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of
Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989).
Like many analysts, Alexander embraces the statist perspective that participation in the affairs
of governments—”civic participation”—is inherently more fulfilling than participation in the
myriad other forms of collective social endeavor. See id. at 43-47. See also DILGER, supra note
3, at 162 (concluding that an RCA can contribute to civic engagement because it can serve as a
vehicle for lobbying local governments); SANDEL, supra note 35, at 331-33 (arguing that
“private” territorial institutions such as RCAs diminish civic resources because they provide
substitutes for the “public” places where the rich and poor might commingle). But see, e.g.,
Putnam, supra note 35 (stressing the importance of a strong civil society, in which participation
in governmental affairs is just one form of collective endeavor).
37.  See Liebmann, supra note 5, at 336-39. See also id. at 372-79 (distilling the views of
Rousseau, Jefferson, Tocqueville and others on the advantages of decentralized government).
Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 4-16 (1973) (describing
how political theorists since Plato have tended to favor small nation-states); KIRKPATRICK
SALE, HUMAN SCALE 492-507 (1980) (discussing the upper population limits of community).
38.  See DILGER, supra note 3, at 140 (reporting that candidates for board positions in
RCAs seldom outnumber board openings).
39.  In 1986 the typical attendance at general membership meetings of RCAs ranged be-
tween 25% and 50% of the membership. See id. Although some critics see this as a sign that
RCAs fail to engage their members, these percentages undoubtedly dwarf the percentage of a
typical city’s residents who attend a city meeting in a given year. They also are greater than the
percentage of resident adults voting in a typical municipal election. See id. at 147 (relying on
data assembled in Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners
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intimidated by the setting because the turf would be familiar and
most of the faces known.40 On routine issues involving block welfare,
an ordinary owner or resident would have little reason to be cowed
by the views of experts.
B. Neighborhood-Level Institutions
Unlike a block association, a neighborhood institution is too
large to be supported by a dense social network.41 Nevertheless, a
neighborhood-wide entity has some potential advantages over a
block-level organization. The block is far too small a unit for provi-
sion of a public good that involves either scale efficiencies or wide-
spread benefits—a service such as elementary education, a sewer sys-
tem, or police detective work. In addition, a block-level association
may be prone to render decisions that are good for the block but bad
for the neighborhood. For example, a BLID might decide to erect a
street barrier to calm block traffic without regard to the barrier’s ef-
fects on neighborhood traffic.42
Neighborhood-level institutions come in a wide variety of forms.
This section describes the limitations of two extant types and advo-
cates some experimentation with a third.
1. Neighborhood Civic Associations. As befits the tradition that
Tocqueville famously praised, Americans frequently establish
voluntary neighborhood organizations to achieve common ends.43 A
typical civic association’s principal activity is lobbying city hall on a
neighborhood issue—for example, a school closing, a zoning
amendment, or a proposed parking policy. Such associations may be
Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 513, 513-35).
40.  A survey conducted in a random sample of Baltimore neighborhoods found that the
great majority of respondents regarded most neighbors on the same block as either “friends” or
“acquaintances.” CRENSON, supra note 10, at 99-100.
41.  See LIEBMANN, supra note 5, at 55-56 (noting that residents were more likely to par-
ticipate in block-level, than in neighborhood-level, organizations involved in War on Poverty
programs of the late 1960s). Cf. David W. Chen, Community Boards Inviting Feedback on In-
ternet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at B6 (reporting that, of 211,000 constituents of city-
appointed Community Board 8 on Manhattan’s Upper East Side, less than a dozen are apt to
show up at the Board’s public meetings).
42.  For instance, some private street associations in St. Louis have gated their streets. See
Oakerson, supra note 27, at 59.
43.  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-24 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1835). On neighborhood organizations in par-
ticular, see CRENSON, supra note 10.
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effective in these limited endeavors. Nevertheless, a voluntary
association’s efforts to raise funds and to mobilize volunteer labor are
likely to be beset by free riding.44 As a result, neighborhood civic
associations rarely succeed in providing a broad array of public
goods.45
2. Community Development Corporations. Around 1960, Paul
Ylvisaker launched a Ford Foundation program to establish local
nonprofit corporations to revitalize declining neighborhoods.46 As
part of the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty, in the mid-
1960s the federal government joined the Ford Foundation in
subsidizing these Community Development Corporations (CDCs).47
Although the names of the relevant Ford Foundation players and
federal statutes have changed, these flows of financial aid have
continued. By the early 1990s, there were over 2,000 CDCs,
supported by an elaborate web of foundation grants, direct federal
subsidies, city pass-throughs of federal Community Development
Block Grant funds, bank donations prompted by the federal
Community Reinvestment Act, and so on.48
CDCs aim to serve neighborhoods, usually large ones. To cite an
extreme example, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation,
a prominent CDC formed in the mid-1960s, was designed for a
Brooklyn neighborhood with a population of 450,000.49 A national
survey conducted in 1988 found that, based on locally provided
population estimates, neighborhoods served by CDCs had a mean
population of 69,000 and a median population of 32,500.50 These are
not closely knit groups.
44.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45.  The best-known attempts to mobilize a neighborhood for radical political change ul-
timately failed. See ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY 53-56 (1995) (describing
Saul Alinsky’s efforts, beginning in 1938, to organize Chicago’s Back of the Yards neighbor-
hood for militant political action); HALLMAN, supra note 9, at 129-40 (recounting the flop of a
Tom Hayden-led effort to build a social protest movement in a poor Newark neighborhood in
1964-66).
46.  See HALPERN, supra note 45, at 89-101.
47.  See id. at 106-24.
48.  See generally id.; AVIS C. VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY
OF URBAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1992). A first-rate, if now dated, dis-
cussion of CDCs appears in ROBERT K. YIN & DOUGLAS YATES, STREET-LEVEL GOV-
ERNMENTS 141-57 (1975), a book that, despite its title, has little to do with block-level institu-
tions.
49.  See YIN & YATES, supra note 48, at 146.
50.  See VIDAL, supra note 48, at 38.
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Although the activities of CDCs vary, few focus on providing
public goods. Instead, most strive to produce private goods. Thus,
CDCs develop and rehabilitate housing, open supermarkets and
small shopping centers, and engage in (or support) business enter-
prises.51 This strategy has proved to be unsound. Both theory and evi-
dence suggest that a nonprofit organization is unlikely to be as effi-
cient as a small for-profit firm in providing private goods.52 A CDC
commonly is governed by an ungainly board of directors that may in-
clude donor representatives, neighborhood activists, local business
leaders, and city functionaries.53 A small for-profit firm has the ad-
vantages of a leaner management structure and sharper financial in-
centives to perform. Although the Ford Foundation originally had
hoped that individual CDCs would become economically self-
sufficient, virtually all of them have continued to require heavy fi-
nancial support.54 In most settings, the CDC strategy has turned out
to have been an expensive blind alley.55
3. Toward Experimentation with Neighborhood Improvement
Districts. The foundations that have been supporting CDCs might
consider funding experiments involving a quite different form of
neighborhood organization. I envision a Neighborhood Improvement
District (NID) as a mandatory-membership organization of property
51.  See id. at 5-7.
52.  See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 238-42 (1996) (discussing
when nonprofits are most likely to compete successfully); Michael H. Schill, The Role of the
Nonprofit Sector in Low-Income Housing Production, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 74 (1994) (asserting
that the niche for nonprofits is project-based housing subsidies, which usually are less efficient
than housing allowances spendable on for-profit housing). Direct evidence on the issue of the
relative efficiency of nonprofit housing developers is sparse. But cf. R. ALLEN HAYS, THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 128 (2d ed. 1995) (reporting that, of develop-
ers involved in the federal government’s section 236 new construction program, 32.6% of non-
profits lost their projects through default, while only 7.1% of for-profits did).
53.  For example, the unwieldy board of the nonprofit South Bronx Development Organi-
zation includes city officials, state officials, and representatives from six community boards. See
HALLMAN, supra note 9, at 220. For a more general survey of CDC board composition, see
VIDAL, supra note 48, at 39-40.
54.  See HALPERN, supra note 45, at 139-40.
55.  Most published evaluations of CDCs are far more upbeat. See, e.g., Brian Glick &
Matthew J. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel to Community-Based
Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 105 (1997) (arguing that CDCs can succeed in protecting and reviving their neighbor-
hoods when they receive effective legal assistance). But cf. Michael H. Schill, Assessing the
Role of Community Development Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753, 781 (1996-97) (concluding that evidence needed for as-
sessment of CDC economic-development activity is not yet available).
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owners—a BLID expanded to the area of a neighborhood. For
instance, an enabling act might authorize the owners of a
supermajority of the property in thirty blocks of Washington Heights
to create a NID. Unlike a CDC, a NID would concentrate on the
production of public goods, such as the neighborhood-wide security
and cleanup programs that some of the larger Business Improvement
Districts have engaged in.56
There are precedents for property-based associations encom-
passing large territories and populations. Several BIDs in Manhattan
include 100 or more blocks.57 A developer of a large-scale planned
community such as Columbia, Maryland, commonly creates an um-
brella RCA to provide community-wide public goods58 that a sec-
tional RCA would have inadequate incentives to deliver.
Despite these prototypes, experience with RCAs suggests that a
micro-territorial institution functions better when scaled at the level
of the block, not of the neighborhood.59 Nonetheless, because a
neighborhood-level entity would fill a different institutional niche,
the nation would benefit if a few states were to serve as laboratories
for limited experiments with the retrofitting of NIDs to existing
neighborhoods.
C. Cities
The primary function of a municipality is to provide local public
goods. An efficient city would provide a service as long as the mar-
ginal benefits of the service would exceed the marginal costs of pro-
viding it. If cities in fact could achieve that level of competence, there
would be little or no case for establishing block- and neighborhood-
level institutions. It is hardly news, however, that many cities are in-
56.  For other conceptions of mandatory-membership neighborhood governments, see
HALLMAN, supra note 9, at 267-70 (envisioning limited-purpose, democratically elected neigh-
borhood governments); MILTON KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT 39-44 (1969)
(arguing for simultaneous neighborhood autonomy and representation in larger political
groups). Cf. LIEBMANN, supra note 5 (providing a comparative study of neighborhood-level
general-purpose governments in seven major nations).
57.  See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass’n, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 760, 763-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing the boundaries of the Grand Central BID, which enclose an area
of about 100 blocks); Halbfinger, supra note 8 (reporting on the Lower Manhattan BID, which
serves 215 blocks).
58.  See FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 186-87.
59.  See supra text accompanying notes 20-40.
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ept. After a blizzard in 1996, for example, the District of Columbia
was notoriously incapable of plowing the city’s streets.60
Why might a city be less competent than a territorial institution
scaled to the size of a closely knit social group? The basic reason is
that increasing size weakens constituents’ incentives to monitor.61 A
city therefore is more vulnerable to being captured by rent-seeking
groups such as political machines, municipal unions, public works
lobbies, and downtown business interests. These factions favor city
policies that deliver largesse to them. To disguise this largesse from
voters, these interest groups push for cumbersomely indirect systems
for the delivery of favors. Vulnerability to rent-seeking thus leads to
substantive city policies that are inherently wasteful.62 In addition,
perhaps to reduce a city’s vulnerability to capture by rent seekers,
state law and a city’s charter may dictate complex procedures for
public hiring, bidding for public contracts, sale of public assets, and so
on. While these procedural safeguards may stem corruption, they also
make municipal bureaucracies relatively sluggish.
Block-level organizations are likely to be more efficient than
cities in delivering block-level public goods.63 Who can doubt that a
BLID in Washington, D.C., would have been more responsive than
the city to demands for street plowing after the 1996 blizzard?64 The
smaller an organization, the more easily its members can detect and
punish rent seekers. A BLID therefore generally would be less likely
than a city to adopt a wasteful policy to benefit a narrow interest
group. In addition, because a block-level organization would be rela-
tively invulnerable to rent seekers, it could be freed from most of the
60.  See Eugene L. Meyer, Love It or Leave It . . . Why I Decided to Go, WASH. POST,
Apr. 21, 1996, at C1 (“In the Blizzard of ‘96, on 17th Street, we saw our first plow a full nine
days after the snow fell. Trash wasn’t picked up for almost a month.”). See generally FRED
SIEGEL, THE FUTURE ONCE HAPPENED HERE (1997) (describing the woes of New York City,
Los Angeles, and the District of Columbia).
61.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
62.  See Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests,
103 J. POL. ECON. 1210 (1995) (attributing inefficiency of transfers—e.g. public-works con-
tracts, political favors—to voters’ imperfect information). A related point is that some city ad-
ministrations may deliberately discriminate in delivering services, perhaps against neighbor-
hoods whose residents have failed to support the incumbent political party.
63.  A 1990 survey found that most members of RCA boards consider local governments
to be no more efficient than RCAs in providing local services (with the possible exceptions of
street lighting and street repair). See DILGER, supra note 3, at 22-23. (However, the survey’s
respondents apparently were not asked the converse question: to identify services that their
RCA could deliver more efficiently than their local government.)
64.  See supra note 60.
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substantive and procedural shackles that state statutes and city char-
ters place on cities. More specifically, a BLID should be exempt from
civil service rules, public bidding requirements, and the Davis-Bacon
Act regulations that require cities to pay the equivalent of union
wages in certain contexts. These exemptions would acknowledge a
chief advantage of governance at the block-level—the ease with
which the governed can observe and control the acts of governing of-
ficials.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF A BLOCK IMPROVEMENT
DISTRICT
The BLID proposal envisions authorizing the owners of a su-
permajority of the taxable real property in an existing block to create
an organization that would have limited powers to tax and govern all
taxable real property within the district’s boundaries.
A. The Case for Governance by Property Owners
Hyper-egalitarian commentators tend to be hostile to RCAs and
other institutions that are governed by property owners. They prefer
conventional liberal democracy—that is, governance by residents
who vote according to the principle of one-resident/one-vote.65 His-
tory, theory, and constitutional precedents, however, all cast doubt
on the soundness of the hyper-egalitarians’ normative position.
1. Historical Precedents. In numerous contexts American
legislatures have authorized landowners to create, by less than
unanimous agreement, institutions to govern already subdivided
lands within a small district. The roots of this tradition—which is
directly at odds with the one-resident/one-vote principle—are
ancient. Prior to the American Revolution some colonial
governments authorized landowners to obligate reluctant neighbors
to participate in the draining of meadows and marshes.66 More
65.  See sources cited infra note 138. “One-resident/one-vote” is more precise than the
usual locution, “one-person/one-vote.”
A shift from voting by residency to voting by property ownership does not invariably re-
duce the size of an electorate. A block’s property owners may outnumber its residents, espe-
cially if the block has numerous commercial uses and vacant parcels. On the other hand, a
block’s residents may significantly outnumber its owners, particularly where apartment build-
ings are common.
66.  See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
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contemporary examples also are plentiful. Some states have enacted
unitization statutes that authorize a supermajority of landowners to
compel the minority to participate in joint exploitation of a common
field of oil and gas.67 By the late 1980s many states had begun
authorizing urban landowners to petition to create a Business
Improvement District.68
Most pertinently, there are scattered precedents for the compul-
sory unitization of residential neighborhoods in cities.69 In the early
twentieth century, before the Supreme Court had upheld the consti-
tutionality of ordinary zoning, a few states authorized a majority of
homeowners in a neighborhood to prohibit uses other than single-
family housing provided that they compensate the property owners
damaged by the restrictions.70 The city of Laredo, Texas, and munici-
palities in St. Louis County, Missouri, frequently have privatized
street segments to enable abutting homeowners to set up a street as-
sociation empowered to levy assessments.71 Many states authorize
property owners to approve (or disapprove) the formation of a spe-
cial assessment district (or other special district) that possesses the
power to tax.72
In sum, governance by property owners hardly has been excep-
tional in American law. Indeed, the state statutes that regulate con-
dominium associations and other RCAs almost invariably require
that an association allot voting power according to property owner-
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1268-72 (1996).
67.  See 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND
UNITIZATION § 18.01 (3d ed. 1980).
68.  See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 36600-36651 (West Supp. 1998) (first enacted in
1994); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (first enacted in 1989). See gener-
ally Kennedy, supra note 7, at 285-93 (discussing the rise of BIDs).
69.  See DILGER, supra note 3, at 91-93.
70.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 693-94
(1981).
71.  See FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 7, 190-93; LIEBMANN, supra note 5, at 58-59. Most
of the approximately 450 private street associations of greater St. Louis, however, were created
at the time of original subdivision. See Beito & Smith, supra note 27, at 264, 277, 285. But cf. id.
at 294 (referring to several retrofitted associations). St. Louis’s notorious ineptitude in provid-
ing infrastructure during the latter part of the nineteenth century possibly was responsible for
the rise of these institutions. See id. at 269-76.
72.  See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 10311 (West Supp. 1998) (authorizing owners of
a majority of land area to protest against improvement project to be financed by special as-
sessments); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339p (West 1989) (authorizing formation of special
services districts); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 85.38.010(3), 85.38.060 (West 1996)
(authorizing formation of special drainage districts).
ELLICKSON PAGE PROOF I.DOC 12/09/98 7:48 AM
92 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:75
ship rather than according to the one-resident/one-vote principle.73
What could be the appeal of this system for governing a micro-
territorial institution?74
2. The Rationale for Voting by Property: The Capitalization of
Local Benefits and Assessments into Land Values. A block-level insti-
tution’s niche is the provision of public goods with territorially fo-
cused benefits. Both theory and evidence indicate that most of the
benefits of a localized public good redound to the owners of real es-
tate located within the benefitted territory. The advent of a desirable
public good prompts households and firms to bid more to rent or buy
the benefitted properties. As a result, the value of ownership inter-
ests in the affected real estate rises.75
A tiny territorial institution is not a suitable locale for income
distribution because it is highly vulnerable to opportunistic migration
both in and out. Indeed, because redistribution tends to be a nega-
tive-sum game, the fiscal constitution of a micro-institution com-
monly either bars or discourages it from redistributing wealth.76 A
hoary rule of this stripe is the “benefit principle” of taxation, which
holds that taxes should be imposed according to benefits received.77
Among other advantages, adherence to the benefit principle tends to
make rent-seeking fruitless, thereby reducing the incidence of that
wasteful activity.
73.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1543-44 (1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations] (discussing
voting rules in RCAs).
74.  The popularity of the system poses intriguing questions for theorists of democracy.
The general issues are fruitfully explored in, for example, James A. Gardner, Liberty, Commu-
nity and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to
Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1997) (contrasting “protective democracy” and “communitarian
democracy” theories of voting rights); Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community
Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J.
145 (1977-78) (contrasting public-choice and civic republican conceptions of collective endeav-
ors). See also sources cited infra note 137.
75.  See FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 25-43; Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associa-
tions, supra note 73, at 1547-54; Michael S. Johnson & Michael J. Lea, Differential Capitaliza-
tion of Local Public Service Characteristics, 58 LAND ECON. 189 (1982).
76.  See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, supra note 73, at 1525-26, 1532;
Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273,
320-22 (1997).
77.  See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 237-41, 470-72 (3d ed. 1980) (contrasting the “benefit principle” with the
“ability-to-pay principle”).
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Because the benefits of a BLID’s activities would be positively
capitalized into the values of property interests, a BLID embracing
the benefit principle would finance its activities by imposing assess-
ments on the owners of those interests. To prevent free riding, all
benefited owners would have to be liable for assessments, even those
owners who did not favor the creation of the BLID.78 Just as benefits
would be positively capitalized, the burdens of BLID assessments
would be negatively capitalized into the value of assessed proper-
ties.79
For several reasons, these capitalization effects should tend to
impel creators of micro-territorial institutions to allocate votes ac-
cording to property ownership, not residency.80 First, power to con-
trol a micro-institution is best allocated to those who bear the great
bulk of both the benefits and costs of its decisions. That approach in-
creases the likelihood that the institution’s leaders will be pressured
to pursue cost-justified projects. For instance, if short-term tenants
were to control a BLID’s board of directors, they might favor BLID
sponsorship of an overly lavish Fourth of July block party. The land-
lords on the block, by assumption those liable to pay assessments to
finance the BLID’s activities, would have sharper incentives to rein
in the budget for such a party.81 Similarly, a BLID board controlled
by short-term tenants would tend to underinvest in street trees or
78.  In Massachusetts, where a statute authorizes an owner of property within a BID to opt
out of paying assessments, no BIDs have been formed. See Briffault, A Government for Our
Time?, supra note 7, at 41 n.184. Municipal and RCA law both authorize a territorial associa-
tion to impose a lien on the delinquent property when an assessment is overdue. See id. at 41.
Taxpayer compliance with mandatory property-based assessments should therefore tend to be
high.
79.  In some contexts a tenant can reap a portion of the benefit from a local public good in
the form of added consumer surplus. This is particularly likely where tenants have long-term
leases or where, as in Washington Heights, rent controls are in place. See Ellickson, Cities and
Homeowners Associations, supra note 73, at 1552-54. In these contexts it might be appropriate
to include the market value of tenants’ leases in the valuation of a district’s total real property.
That approach would both confer property-based voting rights on tenants and also subject
them, in the same proportion, to liability for paying a portion of the district’s assessments. In-
deed, because market values may fail to fully reflect subjective valuations, a tenant conceivably
might be entitled to unilaterally declare an even higher leasehold valuation. To lessen the risk
of a strategic exit by a tenant in arrears, however, a tenant’s right to extra voting power based
on an above-market valuation of the leasehold could be conditioned on the tenant’s being cur-
rent in paying the assessments that had been levied on that extra value.
80.  But see Liebmann, supra note 5, at 369, 382-83 (suggesting a one-resident/one-vote
system for the creation of mandatory-membership block associations).
81.  The difference lies in incentives, not tastes. Owners and renters in the inner cities tend
to have highly correlated views about the identity of disamenities. See SKOGAN, supra note 10,
at 55-56.
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other capital improvements that have a long gestation period. Al-
though a fee simple landowner has an infinite time horizon, a tenant’s
time horizon is limited to the anticipated duration of the leasehold.
Allocation of votes by property ownership, instead of by residency,
would give rise to an electorate attuned to both the costs and benefits
of decisions, an outcome that enhances the probability of prudent in-
stitutional governance.82
Second, and relatedly, tenants generally are less vulnerable to
majoritarian expropriation than are landlords. A tenant unhappy
about the policies of a block-level government usually can cheaply
escape by moving away. A landowner, by contrast, cannot exit from a
block with the land in tow. A rent-seeking block organization there-
fore might attempt to capture the value of a landowner’s immobile
assets. Any person who cannot exit is especially deserving of a vote, a
basic medium for exercising voice.83
Third, giving control over block-level institutions to landowners
would increase effective political support for the creation of these en-
tities. If votes were to be allocated according to residency but assess-
ments according to property owned, owners of large property hold-
ings would tend to oppose the creation of a BLID in an area where
most residents happened to be tenants.84 These landowners’ political
opposition would be decisive in many instances, partly because ten-
ants tend to be relatively uninvolved in local affairs.85 In practice, the
82.  For additional discussions of the advantages of correlating voting power with eco-
nomic stake, see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *171-72 (stressing the risk that
votes of low-stakes electors may be too easily influenced by the wealthy and powerful); Ellick-
son, Cities and Homeowners Associations, supra note 73, at 1539-63; Sterk, supra note 76, at
290. See also FRANK R. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 67-73 (1991) (discussing rationales for the one-share/one-vote system
typical in corporate governance); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J.
1197 (1984) (stressing the importance of empowering those with transaction-specific assets,
who might otherwise be exploited). But see Frank Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A
Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581 (1982). The advantages of correlating votes with
stakes are widely recognized. For instance, a university typically confers more power over aca-
demic appointments upon members of its tenured faculty, who have long-term stakes in hiring
decisions, than upon students or part-time faculty.
83.  For a discussion of voice and exit, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY (1970).
84.  This is a serious defect in, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-325 (West 1989),
which essentially empowers a district’s voters (not its property owners) to create a special tax
district by two-thirds vote.
85.  See CRENSON, supra note 10, at 174, 211 (reporting that owners are over three times
more likely than renters to be involved in voluntary community associations); Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowner Associations, supra note 73, at 1549.
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extension of the one-resident/one-vote principle to inner-city BLIDs
would frustrate progress not only in the provision of localized public
goods, but also in the establishment of institutions capable of en-
hancing participation in collective governance.
3. The Constitutionality of Voting by Property Ownership. In
some contexts courts have deemed allocation of votes according to
property ownership to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.86
Hyper-egalitarians have invoked the Supreme Court’s one-
resident/one-vote doctrine to attack the constitutionality of the
Business Improvement District, and could be expected to challenge
BLIDs as well.87 The Court has ruled in one case, however, that the
one-resident/one-vote principle did not extend to a governmental
unit that served only “special or limited purpose[s].”88 Thus far, BIDs
have survived constitutional attacks on their governance structures89
and ordinary BLIDs should be able to weather them as well. As
noted, block-level institutions governed by property owners have
appeared frequently in history and have many inherent advantages.
While promoters of a BLID should be free to choose the one-
resident/one-vote approach, judges are likely to refrain from
invoking the general language of the Equal Protection Clause to
impose that system upon them. Because a state and a city can
exercise general regulatory powers to check abuses by block-level
districts, a court sensitive to the virtues of federalism is particularly
unlikely to train the heavy artillery of the federal Constitution on the
voting rules of these micro-institutions.
B. Powers and Functions
What services should a BLID be authorized to provide? There
are two polar conceptions of the niche of a micro-territorial institu-
tion.
86.  The case law is reviewed in Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One
Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 345-59 (1993).
87.  See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 294-99; see also sources cited infra note 137.
88.  Associated Enters., Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 744-45
(1973) (“[W]e hold that the State could rationally conclude that landowners are primarily bur-
dened and benefited by the establishment and operation of watershed districts and that it may
condition the vote accordingly.”).
89.  See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass’n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 773-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stressing the District’s lack of power to impose regulations, issue bonds, and
levy general taxes).
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The first might be termed “provision of supplementary services.”
Many existing Business Improvement Districts attempt only to aug-
ment, not supplant, city services. A BID adhering to this model might
steam-clean the sidewalks that its city sweeps. A BLID similarly
might restrict its efforts to planting extra street trees, adding security
patrols, and so on.
The second conception could be called “substitution for ordinary
city services.” On this view, a micro-institution might assume some or
all of the functions that the encompassing city previously had been
performing. To extend the previous example, a BID or BLID could
take over sidewalk sweeping from its city.
1. The Case for Limiting a BLID to Supplementary Services.
When Robert Nelson envisions a micro-government with “walls”
around its borders, he seems to be leaning toward the latter model—
the supplanting of city functions.90 Because many central city
administrations are highly incompetent, the substitution model has
undeniable appeal because it would foster more robust competition
in the supply of local public goods. Nevertheless, in contrast to
Nelson, I basically envision a BLID as restricting itself to
supplementary services—the model that most existing urban micro-
institutions in fact follow.91
This more cautious conception has several practical virtues.
First, according to some precedents, a BLID (like a BID) more likely
would be exempt from the one-resident/one-vote stricture if it were
to limit itself to a supplementary role.92 Second, knotty issues of fiscal
equity would be raised if a BLID were to supplant city services. In
that event, a BLID member understandably would want to be enti-
tled to calculate the portion of his assessment being used to finance
substitute services and then to offset that amount against his liabili-
ties for local taxes.93 Commentators who favor entitling micro-
90.  See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 60. Ventures in this vein
are sympathetically discussed in FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 206-08; HALLMAN, supra note 9,
at 71-74; Frazier, supra note 15, at 99-101; Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism:
Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 649-56 (1997).
91.  See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36613 (West Supp. 1998) (restricting BIDs to
supplemental services); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-j(a) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (same);
Windham First Taxing Dist. v. Town of Windham, 546 A.2d 226, 233 (Conn. 1988) (holding
that a special tax district is limited to supplying supplementary services).
92.  See, e.g., Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 774 (stressing that the BID at issue provided only
supplementary services).
93.  See DILGER, supra note 3, at 28-30. If denied offsets of this sort, property owners
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governments to supplant city services have offered ideas on how
these offsets might be accomplished, but none of these ideas seems
particularly promising.94 Third, and relatedly, the supplementation
model is far more politically realistic. If a BLID could supplant city
services, city bureaucrats and municipal unions would be likely to
throw their significant weight against the creation of these micro-
institutions. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code currently would
not entitle a nonbusiness taxpayer to take payments of BLID assess-
ments as itemized deductions. Because local property taxes are de-
ductible, many property owners have a tax incentive for opposing
city-provided services being supplanted by BLIDs.95
2. The Specific Powers of Block Improvement Districts. Both the
general enabling statute and the BLID’s own articles of incorporation
should routinely authorize a BLID to provide supplementary services
on at least the following fronts (with examples indicated):
— life safety (block patrols, crossing guards, supplementary
sidewalk and street  repair, emergency snowplowing);
— sanitation (street cleaning, litter removal, vermin eradica-
tion);
— beautification (graffiti removal, street-furniture maintenance,
tree and lawn care);
would tend to favor slashing city spending on the same services in other neighborhoods.
94.  One option is to condition formation of a district on local government approval of a
formula for the offset. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 10-11
(proposing “service transfer agreement[s]”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339t (West 1989)
(authorizing the city and municipal special services district to agree to this sort of arrange-
ment). This approach increases the likelihood of a municipal veto of the creation of a proposed
BLID. To reduce that risk, the city’s protection could be limited to a liability rule (the right to
collect a certain level of taxes), as opposed to a property rule (the power to veto the formula
for offsets). See Frazier, supra note 15, at 99-108. A few local governments, including Houston,
Texas, and Montgomery County, Maryland, in fact entitle an RCA member to a property tax
rebate to the extent that the local government saves on account of the RCA’s provision of
services. See DILGER, supra note 3, at 102. A state legislature, however, might balk at adopting
the liability-rule approach because critics might argue that it would foster micro-secessions that
might overly balkanize an urban area.
95.  Of course, the federal tax preference for city financing of services in micro-territories
could (and should) be reduced or eliminated. See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associa-
tions, supra note 73, at 1578-79 (proposing that a nonbusiness federal taxpayer be entitled to
deduct only one-third of state and local taxes paid).
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— culture and entertainment (parties, newsletters, research on
block history); and
— political activity on behalf of the block (lobbying, litigation).
In addition, a BLID routinely should have the authority to un-
dertake a variety of capital improvements:
— street furniture (signage, benches, light posts, waste recepta-
cles);
— landscaping of public spaces (street trees, sidewalk planters);
— supplementary or ornamental repavings (sidewalks, streets);
and
— land purchases (community gardens, tot-lots, lots with dere-
lict buildings (in order to eliminate them)).96
Should a BLID also have regulatory powers? As Liebmann and
Nelson both contend, there is a compelling case for empowering a
block association to relax many of its city’s zoning restrictions.97 Nel-
son plausibly anticipates that a grass-roots organization would be
more likely than a municipality to bargain to lift an inefficient land
use restriction, such as a legal barrier to opening a day care center.98
As a long-time proponent of the decentralization of land use regula-
tion, I applaud experimentation on this front.99 Most zoning regula-
tions mainly govern use allocations, building bulks, lot shapes and
sizes, parking requirements, and other land uses whose spillover ef-
fects are limited. A BLID should be empowered to grant variances
from these sorts of regulations, although perhaps not from the few
96. Cf. DILGER, supra note 3, at 20-27 (explaining the operational functions of RCAs);
FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 191 (listing the activities of St. Louis’s private street associa-
tions); HALLMAN, supra note 9, at 158-69 (detailing the self-help activities of voluntary neigh-
borhood associations); Houstoun, supra note 8, at 82-86, 121 (chronicling the activities of six
New York City BIDs); Liebmann, supra note 5, at 351-64, 381-82 (recommending functions for
mandatory-membership block associations).
97. See LIEBMANN, supra note 5, at 143 (endorsing the conferral of this power “subject to
safeguards against external effects”); Liebmann, supra note 5, at 343-46; Nelson, Privatizing the
Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 13-14, 66-70 (discussing the relaxation of zoning regulations
through their sale and conferral to neighborhood associations).
98. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 66-70 (discussing prospects
of relaxation of municipal land use controls in newly developing areas).
99. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 761-71 (1973).
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zoning provisions (such as limits on extraordinary heights) that are
aimed at preventing neighborhood-wide negative externalities.
Nelson also proposes entitling a block organization to impose
new regulations within its territory.100 The success of RCAs, which
typically have limited powers to adopt bylaws to regulate members’
behavior, suggests that experiments in this vein would be worthwhile.
Conferring this power might prove to be unwise, however. American
law rightly is more tolerant of grass-roots deregulation than of grass-
roots regulation.101 A BLID’s regulations might irk both property
owners who dissented in the referendum that established it, and also
resident tenants who were not eligible to participate in that referen-
dum. Liebmann, therefore, is wary of empowering block-level or-
ganizations to regulate.102 As a compromise, I urge drafters of a state
enabling act to authorize formation of extraordinary Regulatory
BLIDs (RBLIDs). An RBLID’s articles of incorporation could in-
clude limited regulatory powers of the sort that an RCA typically
possesses. The statute would deny these powers to an ordinary BLID.
On the other hand, to enhance an RBLID’s legitimacy and respon-
siveness, the enabling act also would condition the formation of an
RBLID on approval by extraordinary and concurrent majorities of
both its owners and residents.103 The statute might also require af-
firmative votes both from owners of three-fourths of the taxable
property in the district and from two-thirds of the resident registered
100. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 12-14. See also Davies, su-
pra note 7, at 217-18 (advocating that BIDs have some zoning powers).
101.  This distinction is reflected in the traditional zoning system, which authorizes a board
of zoning appeals to grant a variance or special exception that provides individuated relief, but
not to impose a new site-specific regulation. The distinction also appears in the Supreme Court
decisions from the Lochner era that hold that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit lot
owners from lifting a land use restriction, but does prohibit them from imposing one. Compare
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1916) (upholding an ordinance
that empowered lot owners to lift billboard restrictions), with Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226
U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (invalidating an ordinance that authorized lot owners to impose minimum
front yard setback). This legal preference for deregulation may partly derive from the reality
that land use regulations tend to be excessively restrictive.
102.  See Liebmann, supra note 5, at 346-48, 362 (discussing but ultimately opposing em-
powering districts to impose additional regulations).
103.  Possession of governmental powers helps trigger applicability of the one-resident/one-
vote constraint. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 362-66 (1981); see also Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 474-75 (1968) (establishing the principle); Hadley v. Junior College Dist.,
397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1969) (applying the principle to the election of trustees of a community
college district). A state legislature could test the limits of the constitutional envelope by em-
powering residents to vote only in the referendum on a BLID’s formation and not in subse-
quent elections of board members.
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voters casting votes in the referendum. To further curb regulatory
abuses by RBLIDs, courts could look to the well-developed body of
law on judicial review of RCAs.104 The general point is that a gov-
erning institution such as RBLIDs warrants more and more external
checks as its power grows.
III. PROCEDURES FOR THE FORMATION, OPERATION, AND
TERMINATION OF A BLOCK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
In the spirit of Liebmann and Nelson, this section sketches how a
state enabling act might structure the process of creating a BLID.105
A. Circulation of a Petition
Any person should be entitled to draft and circulate a petition to
form a BLID. To be valid, the petition would have to identify the
precise boundaries of the proposed district. The enabling act might
set a minimum size (for example, inclusion of at least two acres of
land, owned by at least ten different people or entities) to prevent the
use of a BLID to solve coordination problems that could better be
handled by means of contracts or informal norms.106 In addition, a
state legislature wary of the establishment of a large territorial insti-
tution controlled by property owners might set a maximum area
(such as 200 acres) for an urban BLID.107
The petition also would have to include a proposed articles of in-
corporation (or an analogous charter) that would articulate the pow-
ers of the proposed BLID and set out its governance structure. In the
104.  See generally WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW (2d ed., 1988); ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF
PROPERTY OWNER ASSOCIATIONS (1989). A BLID or an RBLID conceivably might possess a
number of other controversial powers, such as eminent domain, bonding authority, and power
to grant variances from building and housing codes. Experiments along these lines belong on
the back burner.
105.  Cf. Liebmann, supra note 5, at 381-82; Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra
note 5, at 10-11.
106.  This may be one reason why many states set a minimum population for a new munici-
pality. See LIEBMANN, supra note 5, at 54. Enabling statutes for BIDs commonly do not specify
minimum and maximum sizes. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 36600-36651 (West Supp.
1998); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (requiring different procedures to
be followed in municipalities with populations of over 1,000,000 people but not specifying
minimum and maximum sizes).
107.  Enabling legislation might permit a NID, discussed supra in text accompanying notes
56-58, to be more expansive. To assume affirmative regulatory powers, however, a NID should
be required to give its residents significant voting rights.
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spirit of modern corporate law, the enabling act would specify de-
faults for various provisions of the articles, but also permit the pro-
moters of a BLID to make some tailored changes in these defaults.
A key provision in the articles would articulate the formula to be
used for apportioning both assessments and votes for BLID directors.
The enabling act would designate one vote per dollar of taxable real
property as the default formula. Nevertheless, promoters of a BLID
could propose some other system, such as one vote per lot, one vote
per dwelling unit (if the entire district were residential), or one-
resident/one-vote.108 They also could devise a system of class voting,
such as one that ensured that both tenants and non-resident landlords
would be represented on the board of directors.
The enabling statute would set the minimum number of votes
necessary for the petition to qualify for forwarding to the city legisla-
tive body. It might require, for example, the signatures of the owners
of at least twenty-five percent of the assessed value of the taxable
real property located within the proposed district’s boundaries.109
B. City Consideration of the Petition
Because antagonism between a BLID and its city could lead to
destructive feuding, the enabling act should empower the city legisla-
tive body to either approve or reject the proposed petition as writ-
ten.110 Anticipating this review by the city, promoters of a BLID
108.  For example, in Walt Disney World, where the Reedy Creek Improvement District, a
former drainage district, is the key territorial institution, votes for board members are allocated
one-per-acre. See FOLDVARY, supra note 16, at 118-19. In most contexts, though, property
value is a better proxy than land area for measuring an owner’s economic stake in the affairs of
a micro-institution.
109.  Nelson would require owners of 60% of the taxable property value to sign the peti-
tion. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 10. That seems too high an ini-
tial hurdle.
110.  Cf. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 36621-36627 (West Supp. 1997) (authorizing the city
legislative body to approve the formation of BID); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339m (West
1989). Nelson would empower the state to approve the creation of a block-level institution. See
Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 10. The city is the more appropriate
choice because a BLID’s actions are highly unlikely to have significant consequences beyond
city boundaries. Systems that would require approvals from several higher-level institutions
would set up too many potential roadblocks, and similarly would be unwise. Cf. Frazier, supra
note 15, at 105 (arguing that the creation of a neighborhood-level institution should be re-
viewed both by the city and by an “independent body”); Kennedy, supra note 7, at 293
(describing how creation of a New York City BID must be approved by “the city planning
commission, various community boards, the borough president, the city council, and the state
comptroller”).
ELLICKSON PAGE PROOF I.DOC 12/09/98 7:48 AM
102 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:75
would be wise to confer with relevant municipal authorities during
the petition’s drafting stage. Empowering a city to veto formation of
a BLID would help ensure that district boundaries were appropri-
ately drawn, that the BLID would not have powers that might impair
the welfare of outsiders, and that the articles would not violate norms
applicable to the governance of special districts. There is a risk, of
course, that a city would abuse its power to veto a BLID’s creation,
especially at the behest of traditionally powerful municipal lobbies.
This danger should not be exaggerated, however. Local politicians
tend to be reluctant to offend well-organized grass-roots activists,
such as a band of fervent BLID promoters.111
C. Submission for Approval in Referendum by Owners of a
Supermajority of the District’s Assessed Property Value
The city legislative body’s approval of the petition would ad-
vance the process to the next stage, a districtwide vote.112 To allow
adequate time for debate, the election should be held a few months
after the city legislative body has rendered its consent.113 The enabling
act should identify the agency responsible for supervising the polling.
For reasons previously canvassed, owners of taxable114 real prop-
erty should constitute the electorate eligible to participate in the ref-
erendum on the formation of a Block Improvement District. Al-
though a BLID would possess coercive authority, especially the
111.  A city decision concerning the creation of a special district is potentially subject to
judicial review. See, e.g., Jensen v. City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381, 385-87 (Colo. 1991)
(holding that Denver did not abuse its discretion when approving the creation of a BID).
112.  Many analogous enabling acts do not include both petition and referendum stages.
See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 36621-36626 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring the submis-
sion of a petition by property owners who will be liable for at least 50 percent of proposed as-
sessments and the holding of a public hearing to create a BID); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d
to -g (McKinney Supp. 1998) (establishing BID formation procedures that do not include a ref-
erendum); Briffault, A Government for Our Time?, supra note 7, at 16-32 (describing proce-
dures and practices for formation of BIDs). A two-stage process, however, would generate a
more prolonged, and therefore probably more thoughtful, block-level debate over the merits of
the proposed institution.
113.  Nelson calls for the lapse of at least a year. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood,
supra note 5, at 11. A delay that long might dissipate promoters’ enthusiasm.
114.  State law commonly exempts much of the real property owned by a government or
nonprofit association from special assessments of any stripe. Enabling statutes for micro-
districts therefore typically restrict both votes and assessments to owners of taxable property.
See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36621 (West Supp. 1998) (concerning formation of BIDs);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339p (West 1989) (concerning formation of municipal special
services districts).
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power to levy assessments, it would be impractical to require that af-
fected owners unanimously concur in its establishment. A unanimity
rule would spur holdout strategies, thereby greatly increasing the
transaction costs of formation.115 On the other hand, a rule of creation
by the owners of a simple majority of property value poses risks of
majoritarian oppression.116 A state legislature therefore would be wise
to condition the creation of a BLID on approval by owners of a su-
permajority (perhaps two-thirds) of the assessed value of the real
property that would be liable for paying the BLID’s assessments.117
To enhance the legitimacy of a BLID, a state legislature might
condition its formation on concurrent approval by a majority (or su-
permajority) of some other relevant electorate. To prevent a few
large landowners from dominating the creation process, the enabling
act might also require that a majority of the district’s property owners
favor the BLID.118 In some instances, the registered voters residing in
a proposed district might be empowered to assent to its formation,
perhaps by simple majority of votes cast.119 While this democratiza-
115.  This is a shortcoming of, for instance, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 190.005 (West Supp. 1998)
(requiring that owners of 100 percent of included property approve formation of a Community
Development District).
116.  A risk posed for example, by CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 36621, 36625 (West Supp.
1998) (putting decisive power, in some contexts, in hands of property owners liable for a simple
majority of BID assessments).
117.  See Hood v. Central Bus. Improvement Dist. No. 1, 781 S.W.2d 35, 36 (Ark. 1989)
(describing the Arkansas procedure that entitles owners of two-thirds of the assessed value of
real estate in a district to petition the city council to create a BID, without requiring a subse-
quent election).
118.  Nelson would require approval both by 75% of the property owners and by owners of
90% of the property value. See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 11. Per-
centages that high might unduly increase the incidence of strategic holdouts. Most analogous
statutes employ smaller percentages. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1998) (providing that the initial petition for a BID must be signed by 51% of owners of
taxable real property and also by owners of 51% of value of taxable real property); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-339p (West 1989) (imposing similar requirements, but at the referendum
stage).
119.  This approval system would be much simpler, but also far less exact, than including
the value of tenants’ leases in the property to be assessed, an approach explored in note 79 su-
pra. Liebmann, one of the most creative proponents of urban micro-institutions, has proposed
authorizing two-thirds of the registered voters resident in a district to create a mandatory-
membership block organization. See Liebmann, supra note 5, at 382-83. In practice,
Liebmann’s proposals would put resident homeowners in the saddle and disempower owners of
vacant lots, apartment buildings, and commercial property. I am puzzled at Liebmann’s will-
ingness to depart from the principle that power over a micro-institution should be conferred in
proportion to the incidence of the costs and benefits of its actions.
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tion of the creation process would add complexity and would invite
rent-seeking, it would also widen a BLID’s base of initial support.120
D. Ongoing Administration
The operation of a BLID would involve fistfuls of legal issues.
Fortunately, the law of homeowners associations and other RCAs
can be consulted for guidance. Community association law provides
precedents on, among other issues: procedures for electing directors;
duties of directors; record-keeping and access to records; judicial re-
view of decisionmaking; amendments of the articles; annexations and
disannexations of territory; and the creation of an umbrella associa-
tion that encompasses smaller ones.121
The enabling act should entitle a BLID to integrate the collec-
tion of assessments with city property taxes. The BLID could inform
the city tax collector of the BLID assessment rate and the tax collec-
tor then would levy the appropriate amount as part of the regular
property-tax bill. After a property owner had paid the bill, the tax
collector would forward the BLID’s portion of the revenue to the
BLID.122 Alternatively, the drafter of a BLID’s articles could follow
the usual RCA practice of independently billing assessments (and,
perhaps, independently assessing property values, as well).
E. Disestablishment
Because a BLID might fail either from the outset or over time,
the enabling statute should address procedures for termination. As a
default, a petition signed by the owners of twenty-five percent of the
assessed value of the taxable real property within the district should
be sufficient to force a termination vote. Because a BLID has coer-
cive powers, the default provisions also should entitle the owners of a
mere majority of the assessed property value to eradicate the institu-
tion.123 In addition, to be faithful to the experimental posture of the
120.  Concurrent initial approval by both residents and property owners would be particu-
larly desirable in the case of RBLIDs, which would have the authority to impose new regula-
tions. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
121.  See generally sources cited supra note 104.
122.  BID assessments commonly are collected in this fashion. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH.
CODE § 36632 (West Supp. 1998); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass’n, 960 F.
Supp. 760, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
123.  Cf. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 36650 (West Supp. 1998) (authorizing disestablish-
ment of BID by petition by owners of 50 percent of property value); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
7-339s(a) (West 1989) (providing that municipal special services district may be dissolved by
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BLID proposal, a legislature initially might impose a sunset provi-
sion. To illustrate, after a BLID had been in existence for seven years
its supporters might be required to muster affirmative evidence that
both the city and the owners of a majority of the assessed property
supported perpetuating the institution.124
IV. BLOCK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS IN PRACTICE
A. Getting Started
Because BLIDs are untested, initial experiments with these insti-
tutions might need a financial boost. Foundations, corporations, and
governments currently provide significant support to Community
Development Corporations.125 If an enabling act for BLIDs were
passed, these same donors could provide seed money to promoters of
selected BLIDs to defray a portion of the start-up costs. A founda-
tion particularly interested in the revitalization of inner cities could
provide technical support by funding, for example, the drafting of
model documents for BLIDs.126
If early experiments with BLIDs were to pan out, small-scale en-
trepreneurs might emerge to help propagate the institution.127 To fi-
nance start-up costs without donor help, a BLID’s promoters could
be entitled to include in the draft articles a conspicuously identified
promoter’s fee to be defrayed from BLID revenues in the event that
voters later approved the petition to establish the district. Other en-
trepreneurs could assist a BLID after its creation. For instance, a
small contractor might specialize in providing security, landscaping,
or street-cleaning services to BLIDs, just as some management firms
and contractors now cater to homeowners’ associations.
(1) city ordinance or (2) referendum approved by either majority of property owners or owners
of majority of assessed taxable property); Liebmann, supra note 5, at 383 (proposing that a
majority of the members be entitled to terminate).
124.  Cf. Briffault, A Government for Our Time?, supra note 7, at 145 (recommending that
a BID be subject to a five-year sunset period).
125.  See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
126.  The salient precedent is the HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK (Urb. Land Inst. Tech.
Bull. No. 50, 1966), which helped stimulate the spread of RCAs.
127.  Think, for example, of the efforts of Edward Bassett, Alfred Bettman, George B.
Ford, and Robert Whitten—some of the Johnny Appleseeds who helped propagate the practice
of zoning during the 1920s. See Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper
Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over Zoning for Exclusively Private
Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, passim (1994) (identifying proponents of
zoning).
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On what sorts of blocks would BLIDs be most likely to sprout?
The wide diversity of areas in which RCAs are found suggests that
block-level institutions can thrive in a variety of settings.128 Few
RCAs, however, serve districts as poor as West 163rd Street in
Washington Heights. Studies have found that homeowners are far
more likely than tenants to become block-level leaders, in part be-
cause homeowners’ stakes are greater and their time horizons
longer.129 Grass-roots leaders also tend to have more wealth and years
of education than do their neighbors.130 These facts suggest that the
most promising soil for a BLID would be a gentrified (or gentrifying)
block located in a city particularly inept at delivering cost-justified
local public goods. Indeed, the possibility of later establishing a
BLID might prompt a developer to acquire an assemblage of parcels
on a block that was prime for gentrification. A BLID also promises
to facilitate “incumbent upgrading”131 on any relatively stable and
homogeneous block, say, one where working-class homeowners pre-
dominate.132 It is far from certain, however, that a BLID would prove
to be a useful institution on a declining block inhabited mostly by
poor tenants of absentee landlords. Nevertheless, in these distressed
environments the potential gains from institutional innovation are
128.  See DILGER, supra note 3, at 16-27 (describing diversity of activities and organiza-
tional structures of RCAs).
129.  See CRENSON, supra note 10, at 173-74, 211. See also DENISE DIPASQUALE &
EDWARD L. GLAESER, INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: ARE HOMEOWNERS BETTER
CITIZENS? (Univ. of Chic. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 54 (2d series), April 1998)
(concluding that homeowners are more likely than tenants to invest in local amenities and so-
cial capital).
130.  See CRENSON, supra note 10, at 196, 260; SKOGAN, supra note 10, at 133.
131.  This is a notion developed by Hallman. See HALLMAN, supra note 9, at 209-11; see
also id. (attributing the creation of this term to ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 72 (1981)).
132.  Stability and homogeneity abet block mobilization by enhancing social cohesion. See
CRENSON, supra note 10, at 176 (presenting positive correlation between socioeconomic homo-
geneity and levels of informal efforts to improve street); SKOGAN, supra note 10, at 17-18
(discussing failure of community-based programs such as block clubs in heterogeneous, high-
turnover neighborhoods); SUTTLES, supra note 17, at 21-43 (recognizing homogeneity’s en-
hancing effects on social cohesion in “defended neighborhoods,” though not finding homoge-
neity necessary for social cohesion). For this reason, Herbert Gans, who opposes homogeneity
at the level of the city, generally favors some homogeneity at the neighborhood level. See Her-
bert Gans, The Balanced Community: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity in Residential Areas?, in
HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 135, 137 (Jon Pynoos et al. eds., 1973). Cf. HANSMANN, supra note
52 passim (explaining how homogeneity of interests may facilitate business operations).
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particularly large.133 Why not experiment with a BLID on the likes of
West 163rd Street?
B. Overcoming Objections
Although political centrists should have no serious objections to
BLIDs, both libertarians and hyper-egalitarians might oppose this in-
stitutional innovation. A libertarian might see a BLID as a threat to
freedom because it would not be created by unanimous consent of
the governed.134 There are two responses to this argument. First, the
nurturing of intermediary organizations such as BLIDs in the long
run promises to limit the expansion of the role of city governments,
which surely tend to be more coercive than BLIDs. Second, even a
staunch libertarian should concede that, as numbers mount, people
encounter increasing difficulty in coordinating by unanimous con-
tract.135 Indeed, there is good reason to infer that high transaction
costs commonly prevent property owners on an already subdivided
block from producing public goods by voluntary agreement: although
a residential developer is highly likely to establish a residential com-
munity association, residents of an existing block virtually never suc-
ceed in unanimously agreeing to create one.136 Moreover, a city dweller
loses freedom when streets are unplowed or unsafe. To enable a citi-
zenry to reap the freedoms that public goods make possible, a liber-
tarian should be willing to stomach the narrowly tailored form of su-
permajoritarian coercion that a BLID entails.
For their part, hyper-egalitarian commentators are likely to op-
pose the creation of BLIDs on two grounds. These critics seem to
133.  See CRENSON, supra note 10, at 112-13 (noting that black residents of inner-city areas
are especially likely to identify with block-level territories); id. at 114-20 (asserting that resi-
dents of poor and predominantly black areas tend to be greatly dissatisfied with neighborhood
conditions); SKOGAN, supra note 10, at 65 (arguing that social and physical disorder demoral-
izes and angers all urban residents).
134. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Devolutionary Proposals and Contractarian Principles, in
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming 1998).
135. Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common
Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 1029 (1996) (arguing that judicially-made
nuisance rules replicate outcomes to which the affected parties “would have unanimously
agreed if voluntary negotiation and side-payments were possible”).
136. In the 1950s, homeowners on several blocks of Pershing and Westminister Avenues in
St. Louis “successfully petitioned the city to privatize their streets.” Beito & Smith, supra note
27, at 294. Beito and Smith do not expressly indicate, however, that the affected homeowners
unanimously supported these petitions. I have found no other scholarly references to retrofitted
associations.
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seek to expand the sphere of social life that is subject to the one-
resident/one-vote principle. They therefore are deeply suspicious of
all territorial associations that vest political control in property own-
ers.137 In addition, in order to protect the security of tenure of low-
income tenants, many hyper-egalitarians seek to impede gentrifica-
tion.138 They are likely to recoil from the prospect of middle-class
homeowners using mandatory-membership block associations to up-
grade inner-city neighborhoods.
Hyper-egalitarians would be prudent to refrain from attempting
to derail experiments with BLIDs.139 These institutions promise to
improve the supply of local public goods, spawn inner-city microen-
terprises, and augment social capital. Theory and evidence indicate
that a block-level institution works best when governed by the prop-
erty owners who receive most of the benefits and bear most of the
costs of the institution’s policies.140 Instead of standing in the way of
progressive institutional change in the inner city, hyper-egalitarians
should seek to identify and soften its possibly harsh side effects. For
example, they might lobby to ensure that a tenant ousted as a result
of a BLID-engendered gentrification would be entitled to receive
relocation benefits, funded either by the city or by the BLID itself.141
There also is little factual basis for the hyper-egalitarians’ focus
on impeding gentrification. Most older neighborhoods in central cit-
ies are degentrifying (and most also are losing population).142 The un-
137.  See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 7, 21 (1994) (asserting that RCAs, which are
called “common interest developments” in this book, are “illiberal and undemocratic”); Alex-
ander, supra note 36, at 45-47 (criticizing allocation of votes according to property ownership);
Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589, 1592-
96 (1982) (equating voting by property ownership with “plutocracy,” a regime inherently offen-
sive to liberalism); Kennedy, supra note 7, at 305-10 (arguing that giving residents affected by
BIDs “some sort of vote may be good policy”).
138. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The Economics of Legal Brico-
lage in the Fight Against Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 512-20 (1991) (urging pov-
erty lawyers to fight gentrification by vigorously defending against evictions); Margaret Jane
Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986) (defending the use of rent
control to protect tenants’ roots and to maintain existing communities of tenants). But see Rob-
ert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 950-54 (1991)
(critiquing Radin’s analysis).
139. Cf. Davies, supra note 7, at 220-23 (arguing that BIDs may further egalitarian goals).
140. See supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (1994) (authorizing relocation assistance to those displaced by cer-
tain federally funded programs).
142. See John D. Kasarda et al., Central-City and Suburban Migration Patterns: Is a Turn-
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ceasing suburbanization of middle-class households is leading to ever
greater disparities between central-city and suburban wealth.143 This
is worrisome, in part, because middle-class residents of a socially di-
verse urban neighborhood can be valuable role models for lower-
class residents.144 In the long run, poor people living in inner cities
would benefit from the creation of new micro-institutions such as
BLIDs.145
CONCLUSION
Many wealthy people in the United States live in managed resi-
dential environments that largely insulate them from the poverty and
disorder of the inner city. Robert Reich and other commentators
have lamented this “secession of the successful” and have worried
about its effects on the nation’s social fabric.146 Some hyper-
egalitarians have sought to reverse the trend by attacking the legality
and legitimacy of the residential community association. This strategy
is exactly backwards.147 The resounding success of RCAs in new
housing developments suggests the merits of enabling the stakehold-
ers of inner-city neighborhoods to mimic—at the block level—the
micro-institutions commonly found in the suburbs.
I end with words of caution. The urban landscape is littered with
failed policy initiatives. The merits of retrofitting mandatory-
membership institutions onto already subdivided blocks are uncer-
tain. This proposal for experiments with Block Improvement Dis-
tricts assumes that their benefits can be large and that only the trans-
around on the Horizon?, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 307, 314-19 (1997) (stating that the migra-
tion of higher-income households out of the central-cities is “striking” and noting the net loss of
households at all income levels).
143.  In 1990, median incomes in central cities were almost 30% lower than those in sub-
urbs. See Margery Austin Turner, Achieving a New Urban Diversity, 8 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 295, 295 (1997).
144. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 55-60 (1987). Thus, an
institution such as a BLID that promotes homogeneity at the block level may contribute to het-
erogeneity at the neighborhood or city level. Cf. supra note 132.
145.  See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 328-29 (urging creation of BIDs in poorer neighbor-
hoods); cf. Roberto G. Quercia & George C. Galster, Threshold Effects and the Expected Bene-
fits of Attracting Middle-Income Households to the Central City, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
409, 411-17 (1997) (exploring the situations in which cities benefit from attracting middle-
income households).
146. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 at 16; see
also EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COM-
MUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
147.  See Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, supra note 5, at 58.
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action costs of overcoming free riders have stood in the way of their
creation by contract. These assumptions may prove to be false. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth recalling that during the past half century the
passage of enabling acts sparked the rapid spread of two significant
micro-territorial institutions, namely, condominium associations and
Business Improvement Districts.148 Those precedents demonstrate
that spontaneous order has its limits. It appears that lawyers and leg-
islators—despite their plummeting reputations—at times can play a
constructive role in propagating fresh institutional arrangements.
148.  In 1958, Puerto Rico became the first United States jurisdiction to enact a condomin-
ium statute. All fifty states eventually followed. See Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Re-
form, and the Unit Ownership Act, 58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 500-01 (1997). By 1988, there were
on the order of 130,000 condominium associations in the United States. See DILGER, supra note
3, at 18-19. On the rapid growth of BIDs, see supra notes 7-8, 68 and accompanying text.
